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Balance—of—Payments Crises and Devaluation
Abs t r act
The collapse of a fixed exchange rate is typically
marked by a sudden balance—of—payments crisis in which
"speculators" fleeing from the domestic currency acquire a
large portion of the central bank's foreign exchange holdings.
Faced with such an attack, the central bank often withdraws
temporarily from the foreign exchange market, allowing the
exchange rate to float freely before devaluing and returning
to a fixed-rate regime. This paper links the timing of the
initial speculative attack to the magnitude of the expected
devaluation and to the length of the transitional period of
floating. An implication of the analysis is that there exist
devaluations so sharp and transition periods so short that a
crisis must occur the moment the market first learns that the
current exchange parity will eventually be altered. For suf-
ficiently long transition periods, the floating exchange rate
"overshoots" its new peg before appreciating back toward it;
for shorter periods, the rate depreciates monotonically to its
new fixed level. Accordingly, the central bank's return to
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A central bank that tolerates a persistent balance-of-
payments deficit will ultimately find itself unable to peg
the exchange rate between domestic and foreign currency.
If capital is internationally mobile, the collapse of the
fixed exchange rate is typically sparked by a sudden balance-
of—payments crisis in which "speculators" fleeing from the
domestic currency acquire a large portion of the central
bankts foreign reserve stock. Faced with this reserve
hemorrhage, the bank must withdraw from the foreign exchange
market and allow the exchange rate to float, at least
temporarily.
Can economic theory throw any light on the timing
of such speculative attacks? In a perceptive analysis,
Krugman []demonstratesthat when agents have perfect
foresight, asset markets can be continuously in equilibrium
only if the attack occurs on a unique, well—defineddate.
A balance—of—payments crisis will generally take place
only after the date upon which it first becomes apparent
that the fixed exchange rate cannot be defended indefinitely.
Roughly speaking, the time of the attack is determined by the
requirement that no discrete jump in the equilibrium exchange
rate occur at the moment the transition from a fixed to a
floating—rate regime is made.
The timing of a crisis thus depends on the policies—2—
agents expect the central bank to pursue during and after a run
on its reserve stock. Krugman 13] analyzes the case }n which
the bank commits its entire reserve stock to the defense of the
currency, and, after losing that stock, never again intervenes
to influence the exchangerate.V More frequently, however,
a central bank abandons the current exchange rate before the
speculators have acquired all its reserves, and then, after a
transitional period of floating, re—pegs the rate at a higher
level. In other words, the balance—of-payments crisis leads
to a devaluation rather than to a permanent abandonment of
the fixed exchange rate regime.
This paper studies how the expectation of subsequent
devaluation affects the timing of balance—of—payments crises.
Section I describes a simple open—economy model, and Section
II uses it to link the date of a crisis to the magnitude of
the expected devaluation and the duration of the transitional
float. While crises occur earlier the greater the anticipated
devaluation, their timing is related to the length of the
floating—rate interval in a more complicated way. That relation
is explored in Section III, which analyzes the exchange rate's
behavior during the interlude of floating. An implication of
the analysis is that there exist transition periods so short
and devaluations so large that a crisis must occur the moment
agents discover that the exchange parity will eventually be
altered. If a crisis is inevitable and agents learn that the
central bank will respond with an immediate devaluation, then
the crisis must take place immediately.—3—
I.The Model
The simple linear example used here is taken directly
from Flood and Garber [2]. We consider a smallopen economy
whose residents consume a single consumption good suppliedby
both foreign and domestic producers. Two assets are available,
domestic money (which foreigners do not hold) and an inter-
nationally tradable bond whose face value in terms of foreign
currency is fixed. The domestic money price of the consumption
good is denoted by P, while the foreign—currency price of con-
sumption is P. The two prices are linked bythearbitrage
relation
PEP*, (i)
where E, the exchange rate, is the price of foreignmoney in
terms of home money. P is exogenous andconstant; for con-
venience, the normalization *= 1is adopted. An additional
assumption of convenience is that the interest rate on foreign—
currency bonds is constant and equal to zero.
The demand for domestic real money balances isa decreasing
function of the rate of exchange depreciation:
=a—8(E/E). (2)
According to (1) and (2), a higher home inflation rate leads—4—
assetholders to devote a greater share of their portfolios




whereDtis the domestic credit component of the monetary
base and Rt is the stock of foreign reserves of the central
bank, valued in home currency at the exchange rate prevail—
ing on the purchase date.In equilibrium, = = Dt+R.
The central bank causes domestic credit to evolve over time
according to the rule
=> 0. (1)
Rule is always followed, under all exchange—rate regimes.
Under a fixed exchange rate and with perfect capital
mobility, the foreign reserve stock Rt is an endogenous variable
that can jump discontinuously as private residents re—balance
their portfolios in response to current or anticipated shocks.
Accordingly, at times t when the reserve stock undergoes a
discrete change, the analysis below will distinguish between the
left—hand and right-hand limits of the reserve path, denoted by
=urnR ,R=limR . (5) t St S s-'t s+t
s<t s>t—5—
A notational convention similar to (5) will be applied below to
other non-predetermined variables. The domestic credit stock is not
among these, however: provided the central bank adheres rigidly
to rule (Ii), making no discrete changes in its domestic assets,
Dt is a predetermined variable and must change continuously.
If the exchange rate is initially fixed at level E, so
that E/E =0,the equilibrium level of nominal balances must,
by (2), be constant at level
M =c. (6)
By (3) and ()), therefore, official international reserves
must decline at rate p as long as the exchange rate remains pegged:
=-. (1)
The reserve loss has as its counterpart a continuing private-
sector capital outflow; and the fixed exchange rate must be
abandoned once the stock of reserves earmarked for defense of
the exchange rate E has been exhausted. As Krugman [3] observes,
the collapse of the exchange rate will involve a balance-of-
payments crisis in which domestic residents suddenly acquire the
non—earmarked portion of the central bank's foreign reserve stock.
The precise timing of the crisis depends on the pelicies
agents expect the central bank to adopt in response to a—6—
runon its reserves. Krugman [3] focuses on the case in which
the central bank withdraws permanently from the foreign exchange
market after the run; but there are other possibilities. The
next section studies how anticipated post—attack policies af-
fect the timing of the speculative attack.
II. Crises and Devaluation
Central banks rarely commit all their reserves to
defending an indefensible exchange rate. Typically, the
central bank will simply withdraw from the foreign exchange
market once a balance—of—payments crisis has driven foreign
reserves to a level it deems dangerously low. After a
transitional period of floating, the exchange rate is formally
devalued and pegged at its new, higher level. The establishment
of a "realistic" exchange rate may evoke an initial capital in-
flow; but unless the devaluation is accompanied by appropriately
restrictive macroeconomic measures, further crises will inevitably
occur.—
To study how this scenario influences the timing of the
initial attack, some assumptions about agentst information are
required. It is assumed that the length of the transitional
period of floating, denoted by T, is known with certainty.
Further, agents are assumed to know the level E'> E to which
the exchange rate will be devalued at the end of the transition.
A final piece of information that must be available is the—7—
res'erve level >0at which the monetary authority abandons
the current fixed exchange rate. The case emphasized in [3]
is the case t=in which, following a crisis, the exchange
rate is allowed to float freely forever.
Time begins at t =0.The time T at which the attack
on the exchange rate occurs is calculated, as ususal, by a
process of backward induction. The key to the solution is the
observation that along a perfect—foresight path, agentscan
never expect a discrete jump in the level of the exchange
rate: a jump, if anticipated, would provide agents with a
profitable arbitrage opportunity inconsistent with the hypo-
thesized equilibrium (see [3]). This principle delivers two
restrictions on the economy's path. At time T, when the central
bank allows the exchange rate to float, the initial fixedex-
change rate E must coincide with the exchange rateET equili-
brating the asset markets. Further, as t approaches T+T (the
moment at which the central bank re—enters theforeign exchange
marketlthe eouilibrjum floating exchange rateEt must converge to
the new par value, E'.Only the depreciation rate E/E can jump.
Consider first the behavior of the exchange rate during
the transitional period of floating. That behavior isgoverned
by equation (2). A general solution to thenon—autonomous





where k is an arbitrary constant. Note that B =R,while reserves
—arelost in the attack. The particular sQiution of (2)
associated with asset—market equilibrium can be determined by
invoking the necessary terminal condition ET+= Et; and the
unique value of k consistent with this terminal condition is,
by (8), k =te_T+T)/8The path of the exchange rate during
the transition period is therefore described by
T+T
E tet_T_T)u1'8 + If( +)e5_tds. (9) t 8 S
t
By equating the original fixed exchange rateto the
value for E given by (9), the time T at which the balance-of-
payments crisis occurs can be calculated. A convenient expres-
sion for E is obtained by setting t =Tin (9), integrating by
parts, and applying (14):
E =E;eT/8+ -(a -eT/8)+ 1(DT + )(i -e_aT/'8)
—e_an/'8. (io)
To find T, equate the right—hand side of (10) to E and substitute




-B-. (11) T =(i—eT)
a—9—
Expression(ii) shows how the anticipated official
response to a balance-of—payments crisis influences the date
of its occurrence. The equilibrium value of T is clearly a
declining function of E' ,theanticipated post—devaluation
exchange rate; thus, the greater the expected devaluation,
the sooner the speculative attack occurs. Indeed, there
exist devaluations sufficiently drastic that T < 0. In these
cases, the currency is attacked the moment the market learns
that the fixed exchange rate cannot be maintained forever.
The relation between T and T is more complex, and is
graphed in Figure 1; for future reference,
=u(l-eT)-(a/){pT-(E'-
(12) dT aT/s —aT/s 2 pe (1 —e
An intuitive explanation of Figure 1 is most easily given
after the next section's discussion of exchange rate behavior
during the floating—rate interlude. Note, however, that
as t-+0,T -—, sothat a run must occur at time 0 if the
transitional period T is sufficiently short.../ In particular,
if it is known that the monetary authority will devalue the
instant the attack takes place CT0), the run must occur as
soon as the inevitability of a crisis is perceived. When the








float, domestic money holders can avoid an anticipated dis-
crete capital loss only if they stage an immediate attack.
III. Exchange Rate Dynamics during the Transition Period
A useful benchmark for the purposes of this section is
the case T =studied in [2] and in [3]. When the central
bank leaves the foreign exchange market forever after the
speculative attack, the date of the attack, denoted T*, is
given by
T* = — D0—
— (13)
[let T -inequation (11)]. How does the exchange rate be-
have after floating in this limiting case? By (9), the ex-
change rate Et is equal to (Dt + )/a + for t > T*. It
follows that the exchange rate's time derivative is constant
at p/a during the (infinite) period of floating following the
attack.
Return now to the assumption t < .IfPT/a =E'—
then,by (ii) and (13), T =T*:the crisis occurs on the same
date as it would if the exchange rate were neverre—pegged.
The reason for this is that the exchange rate can move from E
to E' over the transitional period if it rises at theconstant
rate p/a characterizing the case T =. Becausethe demand
for money the instant after the attack is then the same as in—11—
the case t= , theattack must occur at time T*. The exis-
tence of a finite tsuchthat the attack occurs at T* is
reflected in Figure 1.
The foregoing transition time is a borderline case.
It is now clear that if pt/ct <E'—, theexchange rate must
at all moments depreciate more quickly, and at an increasing
rate, to travel fromto E' in time t;thus,T <T*,so that
real balances are lover than in the borderline case the instant
after the attack. Similarly, T >T*when sit/a> ' — . In
the latter situation, Et rises at a declining rate during the
float; but the exchange rate iay "overshoot" 'andsubsequently
if real balances become sufficiently high. Figure 2
displays two possible exchange rate paths corresponding to the
transition times and in Figure 1.
When pt/ct> E'—E,the exchange rate may be depreciating
(at a falling rate), appreciating (at a rising rate), or station-
ary at the moment the central bank re—enters the foreign exchange
market. In order that the exchange rate be stationary at that
moment (i.e., ÷ =0),it must be true [by (2)J that =
DT+T
+= cz'.Through use of ()and(11), this condition
can be written as
-e'B)-(ct/8)[pt-a('-)] = 0. (lu)
















































































r is also the transito interval such that dT/dt =0.
It is thus the dividing point between cases in which a reduction
ifl T hastens the speculative attack and cases in which a reduc-
tion In T postpones the attack (see Figure i).
The foregoing coincidence yields some intuition regard-
ing the sign of the derivative dT/dT. When -r < -r, the exchange
rate depreciates from E to 'duringthe floating period without
ever rising above E'. Since a reduction in -r shortens the
time available for this transition, the exchange rate must be
depreciating more quickly at the outset; and this can be the
case only if the run occurs earlier, so that Initial nominal
balances are lower.
When T > -r, however, the exchange rate rises above E'
during the floating—rate interlude before appreciating toward
'atan increasing rate (see Figure 2). A fall in -r again
decreases the time available for the transition from E to E';
but in the present case, a rise in T makes the transition
possible by raising M and thus shortening the initial period
(and reducing the extent) of exchange rate depreciation before
the rapid appreciation to E'.
The central bank's re—entry into the foreign exchange
market occasions an equilibrating capital movement. If r <
implying that > 0, the pegging of the exchange rate
must raise money demand, and cause an instantaneous capital
inflow (a transfer of foreign assets from the public to the
central bank). When T > T, however, < 0, money demand is—13—
reduced,and the bank suffers a reserve 1oss.' The behavior
of the capital account after devaluation is often lin1ed to
the monetary authority's success in choosing a "realistic"
exchange rate and adopting appropriately restrictive macro-
economic policies. The present analysis appears tosupport
that view because the longer is the transitionperiod, the higher
is the money supply and the less "realistic" isa given exchange
rate at the time of re—pegging. Note, however, thata capital
inflow may accompany re—pegging even if the market knowsthat the
new fixed exchange rate must eventually be abandoned.
Conclusion
When a fixed exchange rate is untenable, the central
bank may devalue rather than exhaust its foreignreserves ir.
afutile attempt to defend that rate. Thisraperhas studied
how the prospect of devaluation affects thetiming of the
balance—of—payments crisis that forces the mcnetarvauthority's
hand.In the model employed above, the date ofthecrisis is
a well—defined function of boththemagnitude oftheexpected
devaluation and the length of the transitionalperiod of
floatingpreceding the establishment of a new exchange parity.
The latter relationship, while understandable, iscomplex. One
simple and important implication is this: if the transitional
float is sufficiently brief, a speculative attackon the cur-
rency will occur as soon as the market realizes that the current
exchange rate cannot be enforced indefinitely._14_
The behavior of the exchange rate during the
transitional float elucidates the relationship between
the length of the floating—rate interlude and the date of the
speculative attack; but that behavior is of independent
interest as well. For sufficiently long transition periods)
the floating exchaiige rate will "overshoot" its newpeg
before appreciating back toward it. For shorter transition
periods, the rate will depreciate monotonically toward its
new fixed level. Depending on which of these cases obtains,
the central bank's return to the foreign exchange marketmay
occasion a capital outflow or a capital inflow. Thestage is
then set for the next balance—of—payments crisis.—15—
Footnotes
1. Salant and Henderson [5]containsan early discussion of
speculative attacks under rational expectations, while Salant {]
analyzesthe phenomenon in more general, possibly stochastic
models of official price fixing. Flood and Garber [2] develop
the computable linear example employed in this paper, and apply
it in a stochastic environment.
2.Krugman also studies a model in which the market is uncertain
about the portion of its reserves that the central bank is wil-
ling to commit. This paper abstracts from such uncertainty.
3.Instances abound. For example, several OECD countries
allowed their exchange rates to float temporarily after the
speculative crises that led to the Smithsonian currency re-
alignment of December 1911. Blanco and Garber El] study a sto-
chastic model of exchange—rate crises in which the size ofany de-
valuation is determined by an endogenous central—bank rule.
In contrast to this paper, they assume that devaluationoccurs
as soon as reserves reach their lower limit: there is notempo-
rary period of floating. The particular form of the rule used
to choose the post—crisis fixed exchange rate makes itpossible
for the pre-crisis rate to be viable in some periods eventhough
agents expect devaluation to occur at the same moment as the
speculative attack.-i6-
)4•Thediscussion ignores the (realistic) possibility that
the central bank responds to the crisis by imposing capital
controls.
5. The exchange rate may, of course, jump upward
as a result of an attack that occurs at time 0.
6. Underlying the analysis is the assumption that B is large
enough to allow the central bank to re—peg the exchange rate
for some non—zero time interval.—17—
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